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Tech Ethics: Speaking Ethics to Power, or Power Speaking Ethics?
Lily Hu*
Abstract: In recent years, tens of product teams, research institutes, academic conferences, and college
courses—the list goes on—have cropped up under the banner of tech ethics to grapple with the social and
political impact of technology. For some, an orientation around ethics indicates a moment of humility in an
industry characterized by hubris. Now even major tech corporations are seeking expertise outside of the
technical sphere. In speaking tech ethics, we speak ethics to power. For others, the outlook is less rosy. Critical
observers take tech ethics to just be the latest tool in the same-old corporate toolshed—new rhetoric in service
of old interests. Tech ethics is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. It is power speaking ethics. But debate about tech ethics
concerns more than descriptive analyses of current efforts as such. The capacities of ethical tech as a political
movement are also up for scrutiny. What is the political payoff of anyone speaking ethics at all? In this article,
the author approaches the question by drawing on a critical history of another moral-turned-political movement.
A critical inquiry into the ascendency of human rights, the author suggests, elucidates the multiple functions
of moral reasoning and rhetoric in political movements and lends insight into how they may ultimately bear on
political efficacy. The 20th century history of human rights gives reason to be suspicious of moral language that
is evasive of engaging political and ideological battles. However, it also points to the possibility that longstanding moral ideals may be renewed and refashioned into new claims. Tech ethics may yet play such a role:
placing explicitly moral demands on those typically taken to be exempt from moral standards. This demand
reaches beyond what the specialized moniker of “tech ethics” suggests.
Key words: ethics of technology; political movements; human rights

1

Introduction

Every year in late-April and early-May, thousands of
tech enthusiasts gather in convention center auditoriums,
usually in the San Francisco and Seattle Areas, to watch
the industry’s biggest names unveil their companies’
latest innovations. The sequential late-spring slate of
developer conferences—Google I/O, Facebook F8, and
the Apple Worldwide Developers Conference—are like
a techie’s West Coast Met Gala: celebrities don signature
outfits and dazzle star-struck fans; press and critics
report on who best captured the zeitgeist; at the center
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of the events, the products themselves shine (in the case
of most digital devices, literally emitting light) as though
beaming at the crowds.
But unlike the Met Gala, which showcases reactions to
a theme announced ahead of time, developer conferences
also set an agenda to come. Like all things in the tech
world, conferences are about the future. We are shown
snippets of our soon-to-be world—if the tech companies
get their way, that is—a world of fancy wrist devices that
“watch” much more than time, of cylindrical home
assistants that serve as home stage lighting directors, of
phones that unlock at a glance. The futures imagined by
Silicon Valley are idealized visions of the humantechnology partnership: technologies are our tools. They
help us do what we want. The more we develop, the
better off we will be in attaining what we want. The
questions that follow these assumptions—What do we

© The author(s) 2021. The articles published in this open access journal are distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Lily Hu: Tech Ethics: Speaking Ethics to Power, or Power Speaking Ethics?

want? What should we want? To what extent are
technologies really mere tools?—are best left to be
pondered by others outside the conference center.
It was striking, then, that Microsoft CEO Satya
Nadella’s opening keynote at his company’s 2018 Build
conference looked not to the future but to the past—first,
to the Industrial Revolution by way of the economist
Robert Gordon’s anti-techno-optimist book The Rise
and Fall of American Growth, and then, even more
surprisingly, to the mid-century existentialist philosopher
of technology Hans Jonas. Nadella recounted Jonas’s
claim that acting responsibly is to “act so that the effects
of your action are compatible with the permanence of
genuine life” . Transitioning to a discussion of Jonas’s
1973 essay “Technology and Responsibility” , Nadella
continued: “That is something that we need to reflect on,
because he was talking about the power of technology
being such that it far outstrips our ability to completely
control it, especially its impact even on future
generations.” Nadella then segued from Jonas’s words
on responsibility to outlining the three core pillars he
claims will guide Microsoft’s plans for the future:
privacy, cybersecurity, and ethical artificial intelligence.
Technology might well still be a tool, but it is also
something that needs to be controlled and even
constrained.
It is notable that this dual challenge of the contemporary
tech moment found its way into Microsoft’s biggest
publicity event of the year by way of philosophy. What
are we to make of Nadella’s choice—which we now see
repeated in the rhetoric of many institutions grappling
with the rapidly growing social and political impact of
technology—to adopt the language of ethics in response
to tech’s crisis of legitimacy? It is likely, of course, that
the invocation of Jonas and Nadella’s entreaty to his
fellow engineers to consider “not only what computers
can do but what computers should do” was mere
publicity stunts aimed at humanizing both Microsoft and
the tech industry more widely. But granting, for the sake
of argument, his commitment to the matter, we might
still ask what good it would serve? What can philosophy
and ethics do in the harsh technological realities of our
present world?

2

A Turn Toward, and Away From, Tech Ethics

While discourse in and about tech continues to be largely
ruled by a spirit of optimism, a tempered tone, tales of
caution, and attention to societal risks and harms have
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become features of the industry’s narrative, too. Concern
about such wide-ranging matters as the role of social
media in our civic landscape to a digital economy built
on surveillance to automation-driven joblessness has
technology companies under greater public scrutiny.
Increasing attention to the ways technology makes and
remakes society has been followed by demands for
oversight, regulation, and more generally for a
reassertion of values into the discussion of what we build.
Latter values-focused approaches to technology’s
implications for society, often centering around the
language of moral ideals and principles, appear under the
broad umbrella term of “tech ethics”, and their rise both
inside and outside of the companies themselves has been
accompanied by two kinds of responses. On one view, to
the extent that philosophy can be useful at all for building
a just society, some amount of moral theorizing needs to
make its way down from the heavens to affect the
practices and politics of our earthly institutions. If we can
come to an agreement on the content of certain shared
moral ideals (a tough proposition to be sure, but one that
is not impossible), public declarations infused with
ethical language can give shape to those moral ideals in
the real world and give directedness to actions aimed at
achieving them. “Ethics” can force a shift in companies’
normative orientations, from their own bottom lines to
the roles they play in society: the duties and obligations
they owe to a broader public. In doing so, thinking
morally can help companies avoid potential future
missteps and their accompanying social consequences.
Others see tech’s adoption of ethical language as
serving less honorable purposes. Skeptics not only doubt
the extent to which ethics can transform tech’s practices
but have questioned whether ethics, as deployed, is
meant to even serve those purposes at all. Commentators
such as Ben Wagner have decried the recent onslaught
of company principles, frameworks, and guidelines, and
as mere “ethics-washing”, aimed at masking deeper
structural critiques and preventing regulatory actions[1].
In an industry ridden with scandals and rapidly losing
public trust, critics wonder why ethics has been chosen
as the rallying cry. For companies that have as of yet been
largely unconstrained by state and legal forces, why have
ethical frameworks, promises, and principles appeared
as safe policies to embrace? The tech ethics cynic sees
the easy co-optation of ethics language as, to use a
popular phrase in tech, “features, not bugs” of the ideas
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themselves: vague claims to center human values,
consider the social good, and avoid bias and unfairness.
In his book Radical Technologies, Adam Greenfield
characterizes messaging like Nadella’s as a “fig leaf of
‘ethical development’”, allowing corporations to carry on
with business as usual, so long as they assure the public
of their attention to various ethical considerations[2].
But critics like Wagner and Greenfield are skeptical
more generally of the tech ethics program, even when
formulated by seemingly independent tech advocacy
groups. Their reason for suspicion is clear once you
follow the money. Besides those initiatives that are
official company efforts, many organizations that
forward an ethics-centric agenda—the Association of
Computing Machinery’s Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency (FAccT) conference, the Good
Technology Collective think tank, and the Center for
Humane Technology, to name a few—are financially
backed by Big Tech. Partnership on AI is a non-profit
collaborative effort between several of the most
prominent tech firms (Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
Google, IBM, and Microsoft). OpenAI, similarly, is
sponsored by Amazon and Microsoft, and supported by
Elon Musk and Peter Thiel. Even the ivory tower, often
caricatured as fetishizing separation from the concerns
of reality in favor of high-minded independent inquiry,
has sought a slice of the tech ethics pie and the money
guaranteed to come along with it. The Stanford Institute
for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI), an
endeavor set on incorporating human values into
technology design and policy, is advised by a roster of
Silicon Valley and Wall Street executives; meanwhile,
the Technical University of Munich Institute for Ethics
in Artificial Intelligence has received $7.5 million in
funding from Facebook.
As a practical matter, this relationship between
“independent” research and corporate cash is par for our
neoliberal course. Ours is an era of unprecedented
slashes to the public financing of non-profit
organizations, as well as some of our most important
democratic institutions: elections, libraries, universities,
and public service broadcasting. Whereas ethics
ventures might have received public support in the past,
shrinking budgets in funding agencies such as the offices
of the National Endowment for the Humanities have left
institutions increasingly reliant on the graces, whims,
and self-interest of private philanthropy, both corporate
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and individual. Thus, given that programs and promises
to be ethical need funding, institutions are left with little
place to go but to the standard stock of elite private
donors. Recent unveilings of colleges and university
centers dedicated to the “social good” demonstrate
shocking cases of short-term memory loss: Stephen
Schwarzman, known in part for allying with Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, will have his
name forever emblazoned on an “ethical” College of
Computing at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) in exchange for a financial setback of $350
million, while Henry Kissinger spoke at the MIT
College’s inaugural festivities and attended the HAI
launch. It is clear why these collaborations are also in the
interest of their patrons: for the rich, famous, and morally
dubious, paying for tech ethics buys a seat at the table and
an opportunity to eclipse the more unsavory parts of
one’s history. Tech ethics are indulgences; universities
gladly sell.
Much of the ethics-washing discourse has well
identified the at-best-amoral coffers of tech ethics
initiatives, which allow corporations to maintain
oversight and even steer the public conversation about
their growing power. On this view, Silicon Valley, with
its long financial strings, plays the tech ethics marionette;
“ethics” is a show, and they know it.
But while an ethics-washing story that centers
corporate control over the terms of political conversation
captures one important aspect of tech ethics, it
underplays another critical feature of the dynamic
between ethics ventures and tech companies in today’s
movement. The author wants to suggest that there is a
much deeper dependence than the mere financial one
between tech ethics initiatives and the corporations they
attempt to keep in check—one that is relatively less
explored and lies in the political rationality of tech ethics.
This dependency is mutual. Just as Big Tech needs
“ethics” on its side to maintain public goodwill, “ethics”
ventures need Big Tech for their own legitimacy. It is an
uncomfortable fact that however much external advisory
boards and universities claim to be “third parties”,
ethical tech institutions are in fact parasitic on the
continual moral failures and disappointments of a
hegemonic tech industry. These groups and efforts
survive only because Big Tech has chosen to engage the
ethics discourse while it has blocked most other political
movement-building. Up to now, the tech ethics
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discourse has only been able to make headway to the
extent that corporate power has remained largely intact.
This mutual dependency, however, also suggests that
applying the common ethics-washing critique is less
straightforward than we might expect. All sorts of tech
critiques now appear in the language of ethics for a
variety of reasons—some might take on “ethics” as a
convenient label that now happens to hold sway with
companies; others might masquerade as “ethics” simply
to survive in the space; still others might intentionally
choose to reinsert “ethics” in our political discourse. Still,
the endorsement of ethics by corporate board members
and organizing tech workers alike is unexpected and
also unsettling. How should we understand such a
multifaceted movement that lies at the convergence of so
many different political motives and ideologies? Does
the mutual dependency between tech ethics efforts and
tech corporations expose the minimal political capacities
of the movement? Or is it evidence of shifting tides in the
public’s expectations of corporate behavior? How can
we interpret and update the ethics-washing critique in
light of the highly varied nature of the tech ethics
landscape and of the political moment in which it sits?
The author considers these questions through a lens that
focuses on the place of moral rhetoric in political
movements. What are the political affordances of the
tech ethics movement’s self-conscious orientation
around the language of ethics?
The author wants to note from the outset that her
investment in these questions is not that of a disinterested
onlooker. As a researcher, the author has worked in the
broader tech ethics area. The author has participated in
conferences, organized workshops, and even taught
classes on the field. This article is equal parts personal
and academic interest. On one hand, self-reflection and
anxiety about the author's own experiences and
relationship to this burgeoning tech ethics space. On the
other hard, diagnosis and analysis of what tech ethics
does and can do as a trend, a practical strategy, and a field
of study. The exercise here is an attempt at scrutinizing
a movement and community of which the author is a
part—recognizing all the limitations of theorizing
without remove.

3

Moral Ideals and Political Movements

Moral ideals occupy a delicate position within political
programs. The capacity for a moral political campaign to
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achieve democratic victories is highly contingent on its
surrounding political conditions. Interpreting the
political capacities of the tech ethics movement requires
an analysis of both the material and ideological
conditions under which such ideas and activism are able
to flourish today. But tech ethics is not the first inspiring
political movement to self-consciously center moral
ideals. In this article, the author looks to another moralturned-political human rights, which rose to become the
lingua franca of global justice in the latter half of the
20th century, as a frame through which to analyze the
contemporary tech ethics moment. The author shows
that in the cases of both tech ethics and human rights,
there arises a mutual dependency between the
movements and their moral ideals on one hand and
reigning institutions and their logic on the other. Just as
reigning institutions appeal to higher moral ideals to
bolster claims of legitimacy, both the present-day tech
ethics and the 20th century human rights movements rely
on the power of sponsor institutions to ensure their
continued political relevance. The tension at the nexus
of moral ideal, political practice, and institutional
instrumentalization is a central feature of the history of
human rights and one that the author argues is
crucial to interpreting “tech ethics” as a contemporary
phenomenon.
Second, the author reads the tech ethics movements,
both the corporate and tech worker movement one, as
part of broader projects that look to (re)claim the role of
moral reasoning and language in our political sphere. If
the author is right, then the stakes of the movement are
much greater than the specialized title “tech ethics”
suggests. Here again, the history of the rise of human
rights has something to offer. If the political demands
we make are at-bottom moral claims about living in a just
society, what factors influence the fate of these moral
arguments? Knowing an answer to this question can help
us assess our current ethical movement—has it been
irredeemably captured by tech industry elites? Or does
it have political potential? In looking to the post-World
War II development of human rights, we gain a new
perspective on ethics-washing charges and can in turn,
better evaluate the opportunities and risks of today’s tech
ethics efforts.
3.1

Human rights: Moral or political?

Human rights, those rights we are entitled to simply by
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virtue of being human, project an unconditional moral
objectivity, justifying their priority over the more
contingent facts of our worldly existence: what leaders
we might have, what government happens to rule us, and
what political system we currently live under. Though
human rights are genealogically descendant of a natural
rights tradition that reaches back centuries, their rapid
international ascendancy in the 1970s spawned a new
orientation to global justice that emphasized individual
rights separate from those entitled by citizenship.
Humans rights claimed higher moral ground than those
enshrined by positive law; hence, Sen’s description that
they are often seen as “parents of law”[3]. By
emphasizing rights outside of, and indeed above,
governance structures, the modern-day human rights
movement did not have to confront perennial challenges
of political organization.
Some scholars who study the political circumstances
surrounding human rights see a less rosy picture of their
international prominence. Moyn’s account of the 20th
century history of human rights locates their ascendency
at a time of exhaustion with ambitious egalitarian
visions[4, 5]. Moyn sees such timing as evidence of the
compatibility of modern-day human rights activism with
whatever dominant ideological order happens to reign.
This is perhaps a first hazard of relying on moral
language—even moral language that we more or less “all
agree with”—as political speech. Far from offering a
stable moral lens through which to appraise the wellbeings of humans and their rights, the concept of “human
rights” has always functioned as a political tool, to be
folded into, rather than to destabilize, the reigning
geopolitical calculus of those who choose to wield it, be
it watchdog NGOs, international political bodies, or
nation-state governments.
Consider, as example, the state of US foreign policy
before and after Jimmy Carter’s famously human rightscentric inaugural address in 1977. In the decades leading
up to the “golden era” of human rights in the 1970s,
the US amassed a remarkable record of toppling
regimes and replacing them with right-wing military
dictatorships—most notably in Latin America with
Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, and
Argentina in 1976. But to believe that foreign policy
principles and strategies were fundamentally altered
after 1977 is to fail to appreciate the fundamentally
politically-embedded and instrumental nature of moral
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discourse. Moralistic human rights language could also
be easily incorporated into pre-existing interstate
allegiances and conflicts. “Good” human rights-focused
foreign policies became entangled with the more
morally-ambiguous ideal of “democracy promotion”.
Interventions originally justified in the name of the
former were frequently later defended by reference to the
latter. Human rights rhetoric reached new heights of dark
irony in the 1980s when the Reagan Administration
embarked on its bloody foreign policy strategy in Central
America that left dead hundreds of thousands of civilians,
much of which was pursued under the direction of
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams. Abrams
repeatedly upheld the human rights record of the rightwing military junta in El Salvador that was responsible
for an estimated seventy-thousands civilian deaths
during the course of the country’s civil war.① He even
continued to push for more US aid to the Salvadoran
government, explicitly saying, “The purpose of our aid
is to permit people who are fighting on our side to use
more violence”[10]. The real human rights mission was to
protect American-style democracy, and on Abrams’
view, the junta were “freedom fighters”, so the moral
choice was clear.②
Such blatantly self-serving rhetoric remained so much
a feature of the Reagan Administration’s human rightscentric foreign policy that in 1985, advocacy groups
explicitly accused Abrams of developing and articulating
a “human rights ideology which complements
and justifies Administration policies”[11]. Funnily
enough, the same charge has often been levied against
the entire realm of human rights practice and politics
itself. From their United Nations declaration in 1948 to
Carter’s human rights inaugural speech to Amnesty
International’s Nobel Peace Prize in the 1977, human
rights have always relied on the approval of the reigning
Western political bodies for the legitimacy of its moral
force. It is for this reason that the contemporary human
rights agenda has retained a largely liberal approach to
justice, eschewing the broad egalitarian economic
concerns that have been at the center of other notable 20th
① On Elliott Abrams’ human rights offenses and defenses of the US
foreign policy in Central America[6–9].
② The descriptor “freedom fighters” was oft used in the Reagan
Administration. President Reagan used the term to refer to antiCommunist insurgents everywhere in his first State of the Union of his
second term in 1985. Elliot Abrams adopted the term to refer both to the
Contras in Nicaragua and to the insurgents in El Salvador.
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century political movements, such as socialism.
Reliance on institutional endorsement has thus limited
the extent to which human rights can stand
independently of the larger animating political ideals of
the dominant powers that be, let alone challenge them.
As the US’s war in Iraq so devastatingly showed,
“humanitarian” campaigns have proven compatible with
a diverse set of political frameworks and agendas.
Without their own positive independent vision for global
justice, human rights, even when pursued earnestly as a
guide to moral political action, have been continually
subordinated to more assertive ideologies—in the case
of the US, ideologies of neoconservatism, of imperial
expansion, and of global capitalism.
3.2

Tech ethics: Moral or political?

If there are lessons to draw from this recent history of
human rights for the purpose of understanding tech
ethics, this transition from moral theory to institutional
political instrumentalization is a good place to start. Just
as causes of all sorts have marched under the banner of
human rights, so we see the same in conversations about
tech ethics: Google’s capacity to bring high-quality
information to people across the globe becomes a social
responsibility to augment its user base. At the WIRED25
Summit, Sundar Pichai portrayed the business decision
to expand into global markets as an urgent moral choice,
saying, “Today, people either get fake cancer treatments,
or they actually get useful information”[12]. Following
this line of reasoning—in which Google withholds lifesaving information when it fails to service populations—
Pichai arrived at the conclusion that Google is in fact
ethically “obliged” to consider how it can expand its
services to the 1.4 billion people in state-censored China.
For Apple’s Tim Cook, taking ethics seriously means
calling the business model of ad tech what it is: platforms
built on exploitation and surveillance. What is the
solution to this “data industrial complex”[13]? Ensuring
strong protections against personal data extraction via
hardware solutions—luxury good devices that feature
premium encryption for users. Fortunately for Google
and Apple, doing ethics-aligned business is not so hard
after all. The business instrumentalization of tech ethics
follows the same pattern as that of the state’s deployment
of human rights rhetoric: enlisted to complement and
justify more fundamental strategies that protect political
and economic interests.
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Ethics-washing critics have called attention this
corporate ethics charade, but as the author has suggested,
the incorporation of ethical language into business
pitches represents only one modality of the tech industry
and tech ethics interdependence. While firms might refer
to ethics to stave-off greater public scrutiny, the
legitimacy of tech ethics as a viable political program
also in part depends on the recognition that the effort is
awarded by corporations. Ethics-washing critics have
much less noted this second type of reliance. Beyond the
material consequences that tech ethics groups would
face if they issued a genuine challenge to tech power,
many mainstream organizations adhere to a theory of
change that requires corporate approval—a dependency
on institutional heavyweights that, as the author has
shown, echoes the logic and geopolitical power relations
of the human rights political landscape. In the case of
tech ethics, proposals to be ethical can only remain
relevant if tech firms choose to endorse them. Ironically
then, tech ethics groups become reliant on a certain
sweet-spot of crisis: enough to sustain their sense of
purpose and urgency, but not too much to spur calls for
a rejection of industry elites and a radical revision of our
institutions. That is, a deeper ethics-washing charge may
in fact cut both ways—corporations use ethics as a
diversion that distracts from meeting more substantial
political demands; independent tech advocacy groups
use ethics to bolster their own relevance as institutional
changemakers.
This joint convergence on a weak political program is
no surprise to critical scholars of human rights. We see
the same with modern advocates of “human rights” who
envision a global community of watchdogs for abuse but
rarely ask whether the baseline from which urgent crises
deviate is itself morally and politically acceptable. Much
of human rights appears now so obvious to the Western
public that the moral consensus seems to justify a
movement that retreats from the political sphere. Of
course, the de facto reliance of human rights on dominant
political powers and their governing ideologies
continues to demonstrate political allegiance, albeit a
silent one. The failure of human rights and humanitarian
organizations to see their work as politically inflected
simply serves to naturalize these dominant political
conditions and ideology. Here we notice a superficial but
rather telling trend in how tech ethics institutions are
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named. Many of their names emphasize an alignment
with “humanity”— the Stanford Institute for HumanCentered Artificial Intelligence, Center for HumanCompatible AI, All Tech is Human, and the Center for
Humane Technology, for example. The obviously-good
alignment with “humans” provides groups cover for
failing to commit to more specific political projects.
Tech ethics proposals have thus existed mainly as the
negative of crisis moments: every breach of our privacy
and revelation of biased technological design is fodder
for ethics watchdogs, which can then prompt (gentle)
intervention to correct the aberration.
One such example of how the ethics-washing charges
may indict all do-good tech organizations who push the
mainstream tech ethics agenda is well illustrated by the
activism pursued by the Center for Humane Technology
(CHT), an organization which boldly declares on its
website that, “Technology is hijacking our minds and
society”. Its ethical concerns have primarily cashed out
in the form of advocating for more conscientious
consumption of technology and greater emphasis on the
design of applications that allow users to better monitor
their digital activity. Tristan Harris, co-founder of CHT
and former Google Design Ethicist, sees the roll-out of
recent phone use limiting features built into Apple’s iOS 12
and Google’s Well-being tool as encouraging responses
to CHT’s “Time Well Spent” campaign against
“attention-hacking”. Although Harris acknowledges
that such apps represent only baby steps in a larger battle,
he sees “Time Well Spent” as flipping a switch,
triggering a “race to the top for who can care more about
the fabric of society”[14]. On Harris’s view, then, profitdriven market interactions still operate as the fixed point
of institutional behavior with which ethical aspirations
must align. A movement that takes this tack can hardly
see a role for tech beyond serving as either our harvester
or our caretaker.
Interdisciplinary tech ethics-adjacent research
ventures like the Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency (FAccT) conference illustrate a more
specialized form of mutual dependency in which the tech
ethics academic discourse feeds on the shortcomings of
Big Tech, while Big Tech bolsters the legitimacy of tech
ethics by engaging the ethics discourse. While FAccT as
an academic venue does shine light on important
normative, technical, and critical inquiry in the fields of
computer science, law, and tech-concerned social
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sciences, it is also likely the case that without the support
of large tech companies, the field would not be seen as
urgent, impactful, and generally as “hot” of a research
area as it is today. Applied research of this sort greatly
benefits when large tech companies adopt their proposed
“more fair” technical practices or ethical guidelines.
FAccT researchers are, generally-speaking, not shouting
into the void; quite the opposite, many are in fact meeting
at post-conference corporate-sponsored cocktail parties
to discuss collaborations across institutions and interests.
In environments like these, it is easy for considerations
about making a real-world positive impact to become
considerations about how companies can be convinced
to adopt such reforms. Sadly, this thought process
effectively subordinates questions about what justice
requires to questions about what companies will likely
find agreeable. The scope of the tech ethics discourse can
thus be easily hemmed by the naturalization of corporate
logic.
It bears noting that the limitations of CHT, FAccT, and
similar organizations are not specific to the groups
themselves; they have arisen due to a general shift in our
political economy, in which the realm of the economic
increasingly shapes and even displaces the realm of the
political. Just as the ascension of human rights cannot be
understood absent the parallel dawn of the neoliberal age,
tech ethics efforts must also be situated within this
greater political context. Mainstream ethics efforts fill a
vacuum of institutional political activism in an area that
exists due to a variety of factors: successful political
capture, insufficiencies of collective action, a significant
structural advantage of Big Tech in the economy, and a
genuine uncertainty among both policymakers and the
general public about the harms and benefits of
technology. This stalemate, along with the chilling effect
of financial sponsorship, limits the extent to which ethics
groups are willing and able to agitate for more ambitious
structural change. What remains is the narrow ability
to challenge those impacts and behaviors that
organizations view as clearly morally objectionable—
hence the language of ensuring “humane” tech
solutions—in order to ameliorate those particular ills.

4

Inevitability and Contingency in the
Politics of Tech Ethics

In pointing out the mutual dependency that underlies
much of the mainstream tech ethics movement today, the
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author does not intend to immediately undercut the
critical value and independent integrity of all such
ventures of research. The interdependency does,
however, bring to the fore important questions about the
politics and morality of conducting “ethical” research in
an area that is shot through with neoliberal logic. As a
researcher who has participated in FAccT, the author
finds these conflicting desires exceedingly difficult to
negotiate. On one hand, the author has an interest in
producing work that speaks with courage and honesty to
her normative political commitments; on the other hand,
the author has an interest in being accepted by a larger
community of scholars, many of whom reside at Big
Tech, and the author carries a (faint) hope that tech
companies will consider her scholarship in a way that
destabilizes unjust yet profitable business practices. On
one hand, the author has an interest in scholarship that
dispels with the siren song of political neutrality on the
most urgent questions of ethical tech; on the other hand,
the author has an interest in the community’s continual
appeal to Big Tech, which allows it to persist as a model
of productive discourse between academia and industry.
In ideal conditions of practical discourse, perhaps these
two visions would be reconcilable. But such a rosy
interpretation refuses to confront the necessity of
political struggle in a sphere well overdue for it.
The problem, then, is that the success of FAccT’s
constructive cross-sector exchange cuts both ways. It
proves that tech companies’ products and processes can
be shaped by thoughtful ethics-adjacent research, but it
also shows how a symbiotic relationship between tech
firms and tech ethics can obscure the fundamental fact
of political contestation undergirding the ethical issues
at stake. This latter consequence is what the author finds
to be most worrying about tech ethics collaborations
today. If the story of ethical technology has, up to now,
been one of effective assimilation under corporate
influence, then we may have to face up to a great
potential irony of tech ethics: that pursuing the ethical
movement we most need would actually compel us to
immediately cast many of our current campaigns into
obsolescence. This, in fact, is the ethics-washing charge
at its strongest: a claim about the use and norms of tech
ethics in a corporatized language-game inimical to our
dire need for a genuine redistribution of power.
The strong ethics-washing claim that the political
virility of tech ethics language has been doomed from the
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start shares notable similarities with another influential
idea in the scholarship on human rights. The view that
an appeal to “ethical technology” undermines the larger
political project parallels historian Lynn Hunt’s “logic
of rights” account of how the inexorable cascade of
natural rights philosophizing led to the current wide
acceptance of human rights[15]. On Hunt’s view, once
human rights were born in the 18th century America and
France, it was only a matter of time before they would
develop into a full-fledged form as they did in the latter
half of the 20th century. Whereas Hunt claims that rights
language could only lead to an earnest commitment to
their undergirding moral principles by the powers that
be, the tech ethics cynic sees that ethics language in tech
could only lead to a full absorption of such principles into
corporate logic. The two perspectives share a belief
about inevitability, though their conclusions are
diametrically opposed.
Hunt’s account, however, sees only continuities in the
intellectual history of natural rights stretching to human
rights practice today, overlooking broader political
context as a force shaping the course of the movement.
An “ethics-washing” tale about the inevitability of
corporate capture of ethical language in our current
moment commits a similar oversight and fails to account
for the significance of historical contingency to all
intellectual and political movements. In The Last Utopia,
Samuel Moyn reminds us that a more complete history
of human rights is not a tale of ripening—a slow but sure
coming into being—but a tale about the breakdown of
political alternatives: a national sovereignty mission
toward social democracy accompanied by a
decolonization project toward a more egalitarian
international order. Neither were these projects doomed
from the start. The New International Economic Order
(NIEO), proposed in 1974, sought to upend the reigning
global economic order by calling for redistributive
justice and an international body in which every nationstate, regardless of its size or economic power, would be
given one vote in matters of global import. Leaders of
new nations in the Global South were especially focused
on gaining the ability to override the liberal notions of
free trade and economic ownership that had been taken
as central in matters of international governance. They
asserted a “right to development”, a collective claim by
former colonized people against their colonizers in the
North to both take their national fates into their own
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hands and to a fundamental equality on the international
stage. Alas, in the late 1970s, when a political future like
that proposed by NIEO was seen no longer as viable, a
limp moral individualism dressed up as human rights was
left to take up the mantle of global justice. It is important,
however, to recognize that the NIEO did not fail of its
own accord—politics are always operating beneath
the surface. Rather, elite neoliberals who feared the
effects that runaway democracy would have on the reach
of property and capital undertook a concerted effort to
make known the great danger that the NIEO posed to
Western civilization. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) chief economist Jan Tumlir scoffed at the
audacity of the Global South’s attempt to restructure
international politics to achieve redistribution, speaking
about NIEO with a sneer, “Not only do nations claim to
be determining their own future within a global order;
now that order itself is to be transcended”[16].
The human rights of the past fifty years must be read
in light of a shattered NIEO. The present movement, in
contrast, has not sought such bold plans as restructuring
international governance. It has largely defended a
minimalist conception of global justice, aimed at
mitigating the harms of famine, severe poverty, and
those reprehensible political leaders who starve, torture,
and kill. Transformations of the social, economic, and
political order within the nation, along with aspirations
of solidarity and egalitarianism at the international level,
have been left behind.

5

An Outlook on Tech Ethics

The cynic who sees human rights as descendent of an
Anglo-American tradition of liberal individualism
interprets this to be an unavoidable outcome of moral
ideals with inherently impoverished political capacities.
But this conclusion is wrong. Alternative histories and
origins of human rights can be found, even within the
narrow confines of the Enlightenment.③ In the nearby
French tradition, human rights were closely tied with
egalitarian (though, it should be noted, still largely
exclusionary) ideas of democratic self-rule and
participatory government. There is no reason that a 20th
century human rights practice built on these tenets could
never have flourished. Nevertheless, few critics of
human rights now hold out hope for this possibility: the
③For two recently published books that look elsewhere for origins of
human rights[17, 18].
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thin moral individualist capture of human rights has
proven too successful. It is better to pursue other ways
forward now.
With this framing in mind, the question for our own
movement is simple: has the corporate capture of tech
ethics proven too successful as well? Commitments to
ethics and social responsibility now sit comfortably
within a corporation’s standard stock of business-speak,
while even the nominally-independent-but-flush-withcorporate-cash tech ethics sphere can only plea for
decency. What role now remains for ethical language to
play in a movement that wishes for a genuine challenge
to corporate power?
Returning to the importance of political and historical
contingency to the development of human rights practice
is instructive. Even if the global justice affordances of
the human rights project have more or less been settled,
the same question about the capacity for justice within
the tech ethics movement has not been. If Moyn is right
that the fate of a movement is as much dictated by the fate
of alternatives, then declaring the larger fight for tech
ethics as dead on arrival is premature.
First, there is good reason to believe that the happy
illusion of consensus enforced by steady economic
growth and Third Way politics is coming to an end. The
2000s have already brought startling revelations that the
United States (and capitalist liberal democracies more
broadly) is neither economically nor politically stable.
Reform in the form of technocratic tinkering is no longer
the horizon of our mainstream political imaginary. If the
ascent of a sufficientarian human rights program could
only sit comfortably once egalitarian internationalisms
had lost out to a rising neoliberal agenda, then the return
of politics means a resurgence of ideological
debate—and a potential overthrow of previously
reigning conceptions of justice. Perhaps tech
corporations will no longer be able to smooth over their
crisis of legitimacy with good ethics messaging. The
ever-louder ethics-washing chorus itself demonstrates
the mounting challenges that corporations face in trying
to assert their own visions of ethics. The public is
increasingly keeping their eyes on the capture and
subversion of our ideals.
Second, the decision to place ethical language at the
center of a promise of better behavior is not a risk-free
strategy. Companies that choose to do so make the
explicit and important concession that their conduct
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should be held accountable to normative principles and
demands from the public. In this renewed era of political
mobilization, it is possible that—or one can only hope
that—attempts to pervert ethical language for business
purposes represent such a clear transgression against
the urgency of reevaluating our society’s moral
commitments that the tech ethics strategy can backfire:
companies might find themselves unable to tame
demands for ethical tech and instead need to commit to
them in earnest.
Whether this will in fact happen will of course be
determined by a variety of factors, but there is reason for
cautious hope. Tech workers protest against their
companies’ unethical practices have already been a
surprising instance of collective mobilization in direct
response to the hypocrisy of tech ethics: for example,
Google employees successfully pressured their
employer to cancel its multiple bids for government
military contracts that would contribute to more
effective killing operations[19, 20], as well as to retract a
controversial external advisory board on ethics that
included a member with anti-LGBTQ, anti-immigrant,
and climate denialist views, mere days after it was
announced[21]. In their activism, tech workers are
increasingly recognizing the role that ethics language
has served for companies up to now, but rather than cede
the conceptual ground, they have continued to insist on
an ethics that, in the words of legal scholar Rashida
Richardson, serves as a “moral compass” rather than
“just another rubber stamp”—an ethics that refuses to be
controlled by tech but instead seeks to holds power
within it[22]. As an ideological transformation beyond
just a policy one, neoliberalism expunges our social
world of ethical commitments to anything other than
private economic interests. Rejecting neoliberalism—and
preserving democratic politics—requires this exact kind
of struggle to reclaim ethics from those who attempt to
redefine its meaning and possibility.
One can recognize the historical contingency of ideas
and the performativity of words while also still
acknowledging that some bannered slogans will be more
effective than others in achieving a political vision.
Choosing language is a task of political strategizing. But
in the end, no words, even the most carefully selected and
perfectly suited, predispose a movement to victory. A
belief in the inherent lack of certain concepts and the
superior natures of others can mask the fact that political
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efforts are never descriptive; they are always
aspirational. Taking ethical principles and language to
always be deployed as speech acts should help us to reinterpret our current tech ethics moment as a failure of
deeds, not only a failure of words. Moral principles, be
that of human rights or of ethical tech, communicate a
political end that we insist on. Their assimilation under
other logics is dangerous precisely because they risk
redefining not only the words themselves but the terms
of the larger political project. Their successful capture
disciplines our ambitions for a better world.
Asserting a tech ethics that insists on the moral
commitments between us and our institutions, each of us
to each other, is political work that can never be carried
out by corporations and the elite, orchestrating conduct
from above, but only by all of us from below, collectively
building and agitating for a future that is fully our own.
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